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FORUM
U.S. v. Bear Runner, 574 F.2d 966 (8th Cir. 1978),
represents the first instance in which a federal court spe-
cifically rejects the corroboration requirement for an in-
cest conviction in favor of the normal "beyond a reason-
able doubt" standard. The defendant in this case was
convicted of incest under both federal and South Da-
kota law. The evidence against him rested primarily on
the uncorroborated testimony of the victim, his twelve
year old daughter. On review, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that no corrobora-
tion of the complaining witness' testimony is required to
establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in incest
cases. In so ruling, the Eighth Circuit expressly rejected
the position of U.S. v. Ashe, 138 U.S.App.D.C. 356,
427 F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1970), wherein the Court held
incest cases especially appropriate for the application of
the corroboration rule as distortions, misrepresentations,
and ordinary mistakes may occur more frequently
among people who are forced to live together and deal
with one another on a day-to-day basis.
Bear Runner follows the approach adopted by the
Fourth Circuit in U.S. v. Shipp, 409 F.2d 33 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 864 (1969), in which the Court
upheld defendant's conviction for having carnal knowl-
edge of his stepdaughter. The Court stated that:
"The triers of fact are to determine credibility, and
if they accept her testimony, the jury may convict
on it alone, if after considering any and all evi-
dence to the contrary they believe beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that the defendant committed the
alleged crime . . . " Id. at 36.
Even though the Eighth Circuit cited Shipp as prece-
dent for an incest case, the Shipp conviction was ac-
tually obtained on the ground that he had carnal knowl-
edge of a female under 16 years of age. Therefore, the
Shipp ruling that corroboration of the victim's testimony
was not necessary for conviction did not apply specifi-
cally to incest cases until Bear Runner.
There has been little agreement as to what factors or
general characteristics contribute to the incidence of in-
cestuous activity. However, regardless of what factors
are ultimately the cause of the incestuous act, there ap-
pears to be unanimous agreement that such occurrences
cause deep and long-lasting psychological scars and




by Nancy Kabara Dowling
Murphy's Law Book II defines a conclusion as "the
place where you got tired of thinking."' Apparently the
Supreme Court, Congress, and legislatures and courts
around the world have not yet tired of thinking about
the whole abortion issue: the West German Supreme
Court has concluded that a fetus is a "person" protected
by its Constitution.2 Israel's Knesut has voted to restrict
its liberal abortion laws.3 Australia's Senate is now con-
sidering an anti-abortion bill passed by its House. Abor-
tion was legalized in Canada in 1969, but today is a
more divisive political issue than ever before. The
United States House of Representatives Joint Resolution
for a Constitutional Amendment that would extend pro-
tection to the unborn was sent to the Judiciary Commit-
tee in January. Commentators have described the Su-
preme Court's holding in Harris v. McRae4 as going in
precisely the opposite direction as Roe v. Wade. 
5
Roe, the 1973 landmark decision that struck down lo-
cal anti-abortion laws, provided no real conclusion to
the abortion controversy. Though hailed by many pro-
abortionists as granting a right to abortion, what it did in
fact create was the theory that the state's legitimate in-
terest in protecting "potential" human life was to be
weighed and balanced against the mother's right to "pri-
vacy" - at least during the first trimester.
6
Roe has been attacked - even by such eminent pro-
abortionists as Professor John Hart Ely of the Harvard
Law School - on constitutional grounds. Ely described
Roe as a "frightening" precedent and states that "[t]he
problem with Roe is not so much that it bungles the
question it sets itself, but rather that it sets itself a ques-
tion that the Constitution has not made the Court's busi-
ness. "
7
Ely notes problems with Constitutional interpretations:
"The Court does not seem entirely certain about which
provision protects the right to privacy and its included
right to abortion . . . 'This right of privacy, whether it be
founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of per-
sonal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel
it is, or as the District Court determined, in the Ninth
Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad
enough to terminate her pregnancy. Wade (93 S. Ct. at
727).' This inability to pigeonhole confidently the right in-
volved is not important in and of itself. It might however,
have alerted the Court to what is an important question:
Whether the Constitution speaks to the matter at all. (em-
phasis added)""
The Court in Roe announces that the right to privacy
is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy and then
XI/1
proceeds to describe the detriment that the state would
impose by denying this choice "in terms of the psycho-
logical harm that might result from an unwanted child." 9
But, Professor Ely notes that if the right is indeed based
on the presentation of such a detriment, the same argu-
ments would apply to the inconvenience of having an
unwanted two-year old or a senile parent around:
"Would the Court find the constitutional right of pri-
vacy invaded in those situations too? Even if it did, of
course, it would not find a constitutional right to 'termi-
nate' the annoyance - presumably, because 'real' per-
sons are now involved." 1 0
In Roe, the Court liberalized access to abortion. But
since 1976, Congress has, in effect, restricted access by
prohibiting the use of federal funds to reimburse the cost
of most abortions under the Medicaid program. The
1980 version of this funding restriction, known as the
Hyde Amendment, provides:
[N]one of the funds provided by this joint resolution
shall be used to perform abortions except where the life
of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were
carried to term; or except for such medical procedures
necessary for the victims of rape or incest when such
rape or incest has been reported promptly to a law en-
forcement agency or a public health service.1 1 (Em-
phasis added)
In the recent decision of Harris v. McRae, 12 the major-
ity of the Supreme Court rejects the appellees conclu-
sions that the Hyde Amendment (1) does not relieve a
State of its duty under Title XIX (Medical) to fund abor-
tions, (2) impinges on the constitutionally protected free-
dom of choice recognized in Roe v. Wade, (3) contra-
venes rights secured by the religion clause of the First
Amendment, and (4) creates a selective subsidizaton
which violates the constitutional guarantee of equal pro-
tection.
The Court looked to the legislative intent of Title XIX
to discern that while its purpose was to provide federal
financial assistance to all legitimate state expenditures
under an approved Medicaid plan, participating states
were not obligated to pay for those medical services for
which federal reimbursement is unavailable.
13
Concerning the "freedom of choice" guaranteed by
Roe the Court said, "[I]t simply does not follow that a
woman's freedom of choice carries with it a constitu-
tional entitlement to the financial resources to avail her-
self of the full range of protected choices. 14
A prior decision, Maher v. Roe,15 declared that the
personal constitutional freedom recognized in Roe v.
Wade did not include an entitlement to Medicaid pay-
ments for abortions that are not medically necessary.
The Court stated that although government may not
place obstacles in the path of a woman's exercise of her
freedom of choice, it need not remove those not of its
own creation. Therefore, there is no absolute right to
abortion.
The appellee's religion clause argument was rejected
in Harris on the grounds that "a legislative enactment
does not contravene the Establishment Clause if it has a
secular legislative purpose, if its principal or primary ef-
fect neither advances nor inhibits religion and it it does
not foster an excessive governmental tangle with reli-
gion.' 16 The Court concludes that the Hyde Amend-
ment is "as much a reflection of traditionalists' values to-
ward abortion as it is an embodiment of the views of
any particular religion. 17 The Court found it unnecessary
to address the plaintiffs' arguments concerning the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment because it
found that the plaintiffs lacked standing to raise such a
challenge to the Hyde Amendment.
Finally, the Harris Court held that the Hyde Amend-
ment does not violate the Equal Protection component
of the Fifth Amendment because Hyde is rationally re-
lated to a legitimate governmental objective. Congress
may differentiate between medically necessary services
and medically necessary abortions since "[a]bortion is
inherently different from other medical procedures be-
cause no other procedure involves the purposeful termi-
nation of a potential life." 
18
One could say that the policy basis of the Harris deci-
sion in June of 1980 seemed to rest on the prediction
that the intellectually unsound Roe would also become
politically unsound. As early as Maher, the Court with-
drew from those politics: "[wihen an issue involves pol-
icy changes as sensitive as those implicated here ... the
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the legislature." 1 9 It would seem that the November,
1980 elections, which tilted that legislature to the right,
will provide a forum that will go much further than
Harris in restricting abortions.
Justice Marshall makes an eloquent dissent in Harris
- social arguments that would be more appropriate on
the floor of the House. But Marshall can't vote on the
floor of the House. Those who can are being in-
creasingly pressured by their constituents to vote conser-
vatively and traditionally - against inflationary liberal-
ism. The Republicans in their platform asked for judges
who hold values similar to their own; some groups
frankly work as advocates for unborn children; others
question whether many abortions for reasons of "mental
health" are not simply abortions of convenience; and
still others are motivated by a simple weariness with all
give-away programs that foster dependency.
20
As early as 1974, Professor John T. Noonan, Profes-
sor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley, in
his testimony before the Subcommittee on Constitu-
tional Amendments of the U.S. Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee, advocated a constitutional amendment that
would restore common law restrictions on abortion. The
passage of such an amendment would reflect the realiza-
tion that criticisms of Roe v. Wade are based on sound
policy considerations. Until and unless such an amend-
ment is passed, the letter of the law in Roe v. Wade is
not dead; although the spirit that produced it seems to
be.
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Homosexuals - Will Sexual
Harassment Remedies
Ever Be Available To
Them?
Susan B. Stern
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits employ-
ment discrimination on the basis of, among other things,
sex.' There is little legislative history regarding this par-
ticular classification. During floor debate, an opponent of
the Civil Rights Act, in an effort to sabotage the bill, in-
cluded sex in the list of proscribed categories. 2 Courts
have indicated subsequently that the intent of Congress
was to prevent disparate treatment of female employees
and to equalize employment opportunities afforded each
sex. 3 It has been held that the word "sex" is commonly
understood and, therefore, requires no judicial construc-
tion.
4
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